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CHAPTER I
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this dissertation is to present evidence of a relationship between the schizophrenic syndrome
and a cognitive ability called social intelligence by Guilford (1967) among others.

The proposed relationship specifies

that social intelligence is impaired in the schizophrenias
through peculiarities in the scanning and sorting of interpersonal data.
This posited relationship however, requires an examination of its components, i.e., schizophrenia and social
intelligence, not only in a definitional sense, but also in
terms of the development of the components' current meanings.
The review of schizophrenia will focus briefly on
definitional issues.

The main concern, for research, how-

ever, is to present evidence that meaningful differentiations can be made within the syndrome, and between it and
nonschizophrenic processes.
Next, the construct of social intelligence is reviewed with reference to definition and measurement.

This

is followed by a discussion of selected variables relevant
to cognitive style, i.e., scanning, cognitive categories,
and inhibition.

The relationship of these variables to
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social intelligence is explored.
Finally, hypotheses relating the anticipated deficits
in social intelligence to the cognitive styles of paranoid
and nonparanoid forms of schizophrenia are presented.
Schizophrenia
In 1911 Bleuler (1950) published his work on dementia
praecox.

One of his contributions was the renaming of the

syndrome as schizophrenia, meaning that the process was
marked by a splitting off of so-called psychic functions,
e.g., affect from cognition.

His work challenged the idea

that schizophrenia was a single disease entity.
drome had many forms.

The syn-

One central symptom of any form,

however, was a thought disturbance which he labeled as
autism.
In Bleuler's context, autism represented a dual process.

First there occurred a turning away from the stimuli

of the outside world which, in turn, aided, and was reinforced by, the development of private symbols often used or
associated illogically.
Harry Stack Sullivan (1931, 1953) later proposed that
schizophrenia was engendered by poor early interpersonal relationships.

These relationships, their messages, and af-

fective content, determined the shaping of the "self"--a
fragile repository of attitudes towards oneself and others.
Consequently, the schizophrenic who had been subjected to a
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host of negative early messages and affects found it extremely difficult to relate later to others.

Moreover, he

carried a special form of anxiety when dealing with others.
This special anxiety or "terror" sprang from the schizophrenic' s inability to understand the rules that governed
interpersonal relations (Sullivan, 1962).
Like Bleuler, Sullivan conceived a process that would
make conununication with others difficult.

Unlike Bleuler

however, Sullivan differentiated those called schizophrenic
into so-called true schizophrenics and hebephrenics, the
latter representing an untreatable organic state.
Arieti (1955) incorporated the notions of Bleuler,
Sullivan, and others to formulate a link between symbolization and desocialization.

In that context, withdrawal from

or severe limitation of contact with others occurred after
a process of private symbolization had been initiated.

Thus

a paranoid who could not understand the meanings or intentions
of others (or to whom understanding was anxiety arousing)
would "invent" meanings to be attributed to others.

While

the resultant thinking might appear to be an uncomfortable
persecutory delusion, it was preferable, to the paranoid, to
great anxiety.

(Note that Arieti's priorities are the re-

verse of Bleuler's.)
Whichever comes first, desocialization or the invention of private symbols, there appears to be agreement
that the two reinforce one another.

This is however, a
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relatively minor issue when viewed in the perspective of the
history of the schizophrenic syndrome, and the arguments
that have been {and are) waged around it.
Issues such as treatability, and so-called functional
versus organic etiology, are important and deserve additional
research.

Such issues, while generating much activity, may

have hidden a more fundamental question, namely, can schizophrenia be meaningfully defined.

This question becomes more

complex when the following definition of schizophrenia by
Bellak {1958) is considered:
Schizophrenia or dementia praecox is a psychiatric syndrome not a single disease. The somewhat variable symptoms generally associated with this diagnostic label must
be understood as the final common path of a number of
conditions which may lead to and manifest themselves in
a severe disturbance of the ego. These conditions may
range from a relatively purely psychogenic weakness of
the ego to afflictions of ego functioning by disturbances
brought about by infections, arteriosclerotic, enzymatic,
toxic, or by traumatic, constitutional, or genetic
factors: • • • While an outstanding somatic factor may
be present, usually this must be accompanied by some
psychological predisposition {in terms of ego patterns)
to produce the schizophrenic picture • • • (pp. 4-5).
The above statement is both a theory and a definition.
Bellak's statement that schizophrenia is a syndrome rather
than a single disease must be studied more closely.

The

usual meaning of syndrome is, " • • • group or set of concurrent symptoms which together are indicative of a disease
• • • " (Hinsie & Campbell, 1960, p. 714).

In Bellak's def-

inition, however, the usage is closer to that of the general
adaptation syndrome wherein stress causes a relatively pre-
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dictable set of symptoms, but the exact nature of the stress
may vary, or, more to the point, the cause of the stress may
vary.
Bellak's definition also represented an attempt to
take a middle or moderating position.

The rift in research

on social abilities was mild when compared to that in studies
and theories of schizophrenia.

Issues regarding treatability,

etiology, prognosis etc. remain open and researchers are
still beset by the problem that samples diagnosed as schizophrenic may be drawn from different populations.
The issue of this non-unified nature of schizophrenia,
i.e., its status as a syndrome, raises another question:
is it reasonable to discuss schizophrenic subgroups?

Part

of the answer is to look for symptom clusters which are found
by different investigators in a fairly reliable or consistent
fashion.
This sort of inquiry however, has two parts:

(a)

consistency of differentiating schizophrenias from nonschizophrenias 1 and (b) consistency of isolating subgroups
within the schizophrenias.

If these two demands are met,

it would be reasonable to begin to describe not

~

cognitive

style, but rather two or more styles, each associated with a
relatively well isolated subgroup.
The first requirement is to determine whether or not
schizophrenics are differentiated from nonschizophrenics
reliably.

Schmidt and Fonda (1956) found acceptable con-
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sistencies for gross diagnostic categories e.g., organic,
psychotic, used by psychiatrists, but very little agreement
for subtypes such as hebephrenic.

This study reported 90%

agreement concerning a schizophrenic-nonschizophrenic distinction.

This agreement between pairs of psychiatrists was

78% when nonpsychotic patients were removed from the sample.
Sandifer, Pettus, & Quado (1964) reported a 74% figure for
similar distinction, a higher figure than found with any other
diagnostic category.

In a longitudinal study of 1,215 out-

patients, Babigian, Gardner, Miles and Romano (1965) found
that 70% of those diagnosed as schizophrenic received that
same general diagnosis on subsequent contacts.

This same

study also reported that 70% was the highest figure found.
In a review of reliability studies, Spitzer and Endicott
(1970) report an average concurrence rate of 75% between
pairs of diagnosticians, again for the schizophrenic versus
nonschizophrenic distinction.
Agreement rates in the 70s, while not conclusive,
were promising.

Spitzer and Endicott (1970) suggest that

concurrence rates would rise, if more experienced clinicians
were used.

Briefly, their rationale is that diagnostic signs

such as "flat affect" are often confused with other states
e.g., "shallow affect" or "constricted affect."
This reasoning and the relative consistency of findings in reliability studies suggest that (a) there are a
series of signs or diagnostic indicators to which clinicians
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respond, but that (b} the power of these signs vary for purposes of differential diagnosis.
Tables 1 and 2, adapted from Spitzer and Endicott
(1970), indicate that the sign approach alone is insufficient.
Table 1 shows symptoms by subgroups, presents a brief definition, and finally indicates which other diagnostic categories,
if any, are suggested.

Table 2 provides a brief listing of

possible diagnostic "errors" associated with subgroup schizophrenic diagnoses.

The validity of some of the distinctions

made may be questioned, but the total picture suggests that
training and experience could avoid diagnostic errors.

The

situation here is similar to that of the sign approach in
psychological testing (Weiner, 1966).
The purpose of Table 1 was to show some possible
sources of diagnostic error assuming a simple sign approach
were used.

It does not indicate what information could be

used to differentiate between such items as flat, as opposed
to, constricted affect.

This consideration adds another

dimension, i.e., amount of information, to the experiencetraining issue raised by Spitzer and Endicott (1970).

The

question of diagnostic error as a function of both experience and amount of data given, or used, awaits further research.
The error source mentioned above interacts with
another difficulty, namely, the number of subtypes of schizophrenia.

Even assuming that these subtypes are valid and

\
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Table 1
Diagnostic Value of Different Signs in Schizophrenia
Sign

Definition

A. Symptomatology practically pathognomic
1. Flat affect
Generalized impoverishment of emotional
reactivity
2. Thought
Thinking appears conDisorder
fused, bizarre, incorrect or abrupt
3.

B.
1.

2.

c.
l.
2.

3.

4.

Other Diagnoses

Shallow affect
in organicity
and hysteria
Distinguish from
looseness of
association in
mania
Posturing
Assumption of bizarre
Sometimes seen in
or inappropriate posorganic brain
ture
disease
Symptoms seen in schizophrenia--rarely in other conditions
Ca ta tonic
Marked decrease in reCommon to cataStupor
activity to environtonia but rule
ment, reduction of
out depression,
spontaneous movement.
hysteria and
Patient seems unaware
organicity
of surroundings but
generally very aware
Inappropriate
As above
Affect incongruous to
Affect
situation or thought
content
Symptoms common to schizophrenia and other states
Alcoholism and
Extreme social
Avoids contact or involvement with people
depressions
Excessive conSymptoms real or
Rule out depression and
cern with body
imagined; fears of behypochondriasis
symptoms
coming ill. Health
rituals
Sensory impression in
Rule out LSD
Hallucinations
waking state in absence
use, other
psychoses
of external stimuli
Delusions
Belief apparently unRule out organic
true and extremely reand other f unctional psychoses
sistant to modif ication
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Table 2
Major Differential Diaqnoses by Schizophrenia Subtypes
Subtype

Differential Diaqnoses

Paranoid

Involutional State
Paranoia
Amphetamine-Toxic State

Schizoaffective

Manic-Depressive Psychoses

Chronic Undifferentiated

Chronic Organic Brain Syndrome
Chronic Use of stimulants or
Hallucinoqens
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universally agreed upon does not remove the chance for error.
Table 2, taken from Spitzer and Endicott (1970) suggests some
of the problems of differential diagnoses.
Table 2 only hints at the complexity of the issue,
several subtypes are not listed, e.g., acute undifferentiated,
hebephrenic, simple and pseudoneurotic to name a few.

Worse,

the reported lack of agreement for subtypes confounds diagnostic error with styles of usage.

That is, there is lack

of agreement between clinicians as to which subtypes represent viable diagnostic entities (Lehmann, 1971).
The disparity regarding the useful number of schizophrenic subtypes reflects the general difficulties in the
history of psychiatric nosology.

While the use of corrections,

primarily through added information, might serve to increase
agreement on gross categories, e.g., schizophrenic versus
nonschizophrenic, other complications such as "favorite usage"
appear to prevent even a complex sign approach from significantly increasing agreement regarding subtypes.
One approach that might be useful is to reduce subtypes to gross dichotomous distinctions.

Of most importance

here is the distinction between paranoid and nonparanoid forms
of the syndrome.
Kraepelin (1925) was the first to provide a comprehensive description of paranoid schizophrenia.

While

there have been disputes about the formation of symptoms
(e.g., Freud versus Sullivan, see Arieti, 1955) its place

ll
as a major subtype has never been seriously challenged
(Lehmann, 1971).
Reference to Table 2 however, indicates that paranoid
schizophrenia can be confused with other states.

Rather

than attempt a sign approach for differential diagnosis, the
focus will shift to a different tradition.
Moore's (1930) study of psychiatric patients was an
early attempt to differentiate disorders by the use of
factor analysis.

The data gathered by Jl.1oorewas reanalyzed

by Thurstone (1947) and later by Degan (1952).

The three

studies yielded different numbers of factors, with differing names and interpretations.
conclusive.

Thus the results were not

Degan did isolate two primary factors:

A •

hallucination-delusion and E • schizophrenic dissociation.
In addition he found a second order factor which was labeled
as Y or paranoid-depressive.
Wittenborn's work in the early 1950s was summarized
by Eysenck (1961, pp. 22-23, 31).

Factor analysis of the

rating scales used by Wittenborn, Wolzberg, and Simon (1953)
yielded nine clusters:

(1) acute anxiety; (2) conversion

hysteria; (3) manic states1 (4) depressed states; (5) schizophrenic excitement; (6) paranoid condition; (7) paranoid
schizophrenia; (8) hebephrenic schizophrenia; and (9) phobiccompulsive.

While it is encouraging to note the presence of

scales 5 and 7, Eysenck noted that the scales, due to item
overlap and high intercorrelations, are not independent.
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Guertin (1952, 1954) using a sample of hospitalized
schizophrenics, isolated six factors, of which one, persecution-suspicion, might relate to the paranoid form.

Later,

Guertin (1955) found three factors, with an out-patient
sample, all of which pertained to lack of interest and withdrawal.
Although later work by Wittenborn (1962) confirmed
the earlier finding of a so-called paranoid schizophrenia
factor, little had been done to correlate factor titles with
traditional psychiatric diagnoses.
Again the picture was encouraging but not conclusive.
Analyses by Degan, Wittenborn, and Guertin indicated that a
paranoid schizophrenic factor was partially distinct from
other schizophrenic factors.

Whether this distinction re-

flected item construction or concurrence with traditional
diagnoses was not specified.
Following a theory proposed by Jenkins (1952), Lorr,
Jenkins, and O'Connor (1955) (see also Lorr, O'Connor and
Stafford, 1957), constructed 81 brief descriptive rating
scales which were used on a sample of 423 hospitalized patients.
Of the 11 factors extracted, four directly related to Jenkins'
theory that there were three types of schizophrenia, namely
the withdrawn (I), the disorganized (K), and those marked by
psychotic disorganization {C).

These factors, moreover, were

compared to like named factor generated by other investigators (Lorr & Rubinstein, 1956).
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A more graphic form of cross-referencing of factors
was done by Rabin and King (1958).

Table 3 is a modifica-

tion of their presentation and indicates that paranoids may
form a distinct subgroup of the schizophrenic syndrome.
Moreover Klett and Lorr (1966) and Lorr (1966) reported that
rating scales comprising Lorr's paranoid projection factor
correlate reasonably well with the diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia.
In conclusion, the status of paranoid schizophrenia
as a distinct subgroup of the syndrome is supported by
psychiatric theory and by both diagnostic and factor analytic studies.

Additional evidence, however, is needed.

Rabin and King (1958) reviewed 10 years of research
on intellectual impairment in schizophrenia.

They concluded

that this sort of deficit had not been demonstrated in the
paranoid form.

The impairments found for the simple and

hebephrenic types could be attributed to factors such as
motivation and attention.
Later reviews (Shakow, 1962, 1963; Payne, 19611 and
Lothrop, 1961) all concluded that paranoid schizophrenics
showed less conceptual or intellectual impairment than did
nonparanoid forms.

The parallel of these results to dif-

ferences found between acute and chronic schizophrenics led
to questioning of the difference between paranoids and acute
schizophrenics.

In response, Johannsen, Friedman, Leitschuh,

and Ammons (1963) classified 52 schizophrenic patients in

14

Table 3

Comparison of Factors Obtained
in Four Studies Based on Symptom-Ratings
Degan

Lorr et al.

Wittenborn

Guertin

Hyperprojection • Perceptual Distortion = Par. Schiz.
Persecuted
Byperprojection

=

= Paranoid

Projection = Par. Schiz. •
Persecuted

Schiz. Disociation = Conceptual Disorg. = (None) =
Personality disorganization
Deterioration = Withdrawal = Deterioration

= Psychomotor

Retardation

= indicates comparable factors; + indicates factorial overlap
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terms of four variables or dimensions:

(a) process-reactive

in terms of developmental data criteria developed by Kantor,
Wallner and Winder (1953); (b) acute-chronic defined by
length of hospitalization; (c) good versus poor premorbid
adjustment as measured by the Phillips Scale (1953); and (d)
paranoid versus nonparanoid schizophrenic diagnosis.

The

first three dimensions correlated significantly and positively
with each other, but negatively with the paranoid versus
nonparanoid distinction.

This finding indicates a difference

between paranoid schizophrenia and acute schizophrenia.
Finally, Johannsen (1961) found evidence suggesting
differential impairment of social communication skills between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics.
There appears to be sufficient evidence to make
three gross distinctions among psychiatric patients with
functional disorders, namely, non-schizophrenic, paranoid
schizophrenic, and nonparanoid schizophrenic.
qualifications must be restated:

However, two

(a) each group is composed

of subgroups (Klett & Lorr, 1966), and (b) the relative
lack of impairment attributed to the paranoid schizophrenic's
intellectual functioning may be due to other variables
(Weiner, 1966).
Social Intelligence
In broad terms, social intelligence can be viewed
as awareness of the thought and feelings of others.

With
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this context in mind, a continuum of this particular sensitivity can be found in the field of fiction.

The negative

pole was exemplified in a story by Henry James, Beast in the
Jungle (1958).

John Marcher was the passionless anti-hero

of this tale whose fatal flaw was near blindness to the
feelings of others.
The positive pole of this sensitivity, carried to
sometimes painful examples of empathy, was pressed onto
selected characters of Dostoevsky.

His Prince Myshkin, the

hero of the Idiot (1958), confused other characters with his
mixture of naivete and insight.
Early writers in the "pulp" genre presented a
slightly different view of sensitivity to people in their
characterizations.

Thus Edgar Rice Burroughs in his ! Prin-

£!!!. 2£_ !!!!.,! (1911), typified his hero with all virtues save
understanding of women.
While this last example is primarily a literary
device, it, together with the aforementioned writings of
Henry James and Dostoevsky, indicates that at least some
writers saw their characters as

posse~sing

varying degrees

of social sensitivity.
This special awareness of others however, was more
than a creative fiction, for E. L. Thorndike speculated that
social acumen was a distinct form of intelligence, that is,
not necessarily correlated with other forms of human ability
i.e., verbal or mechanical.

Thorndike's (1920) definition
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of "Social Intelligence" was, " • • • the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and girls • • • to act
wisely in human relations • • • (p. 228)."
Thorndike's definition helped spur interest in social
intelligence and its measurement.

At about the same time,

as indicated by Walker and Foley (1973), interest arose in
person perception.

Walker and Foley defined this latter term

as, "how people make judgments regarding others, their accuracy in so doing, and personality characteristics of 'good'
versus 'poor' appraisers of others • • • (p. 840)."
The next three decades, roughly from the mid 1930's
to around 1965, were marked by two curious patterns.

The

first was the development of a gap between investigations
of person perception and those centering on social intelligence.

The second was intense but sporadic research on

the concept of social intelligence.
These patterns reflected a major difference in two
traditions in Psychology, namely a matter of focus.

Person

perception examined stimulus differences while research on
social intelligence was directed to matters of individual
differences.

In turn, focus influenced methodology and

measurement.

Stated very simply, this became a case of the

standardized paper-pencil test used in measuring intelligence,
versus the rating scales of social perception.

The choice

of instrument however, had at least two other ramifications:
(a) There was limited success in constructing tests of social

18

intelligence.

(This also relates to the sporadic interest

in the subject.)

(b) It appears that the choice of instru-

ments directed the researcher's attention to distinct portions
of Thorndike's definition, i.e., the difference between
understanding others and the management or action component
involved in acting wisely.

Each of these points will be

elaborated.
From Thorndike's definition in 1920 to the early
1960's only two paper-pencil tests of social intelligence

received extensive research attention.

These were the

George Washington Social Intelligence Test (GWSIT) and the
Chapin Social Insight Test (CHSIT).
Though revised in 1949, the GWSIT was one of the
earliest instruments developed to measure social intelligence
or SI (Thorndike & Stein, 1937).

The revised form contained

five subtests of which four were in multiple choice format.
Examples of these subtests are (a) Observation of Human Behavior which contained true-false statements or questions
concerning interpersonal functioning1 and (b) Sense of Humor
which required the selection from four alternatives of the
best ending of a joke.
Early validity studies such as Hunt's (1927) showed
promising relationships between GWSIT scores and ability to
deal with people in work situations.
however.

This was soon challenged

For instance, Garrett and Kellogg (1928) among

others, cited a significant correlation between the GWSIT and
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measures of abstract intelligence or AI.

Later work by

Thorndike (1936) and Woodrow (1939) indicated that the GWSIT
primarily measured verbal factors.

This same conclusion was

noted by Cronbach in a later review (1960).
Chapin was familiar with the GWSIT and probably its
lack of success in measuring SI as a distinct factor.

In

1942 he presented some initial standardization data and the
test items of the Chapin Social Insight Test or CHSIT.

The

CHSIT was composed of 25 items, each dewcribing a social
situation.

The testee was expected to read each item and

then choose which of the four alternate statements was most
relevant to the situation presented.
However, there arose a parallel in research findings
between the CHSIT and the GWSIT.

Like the latter instrument,

Chapin's test was found to relate well to external criteria
such as leadership (Chapin, 1942), but Gough (1965, 1968)
found significant correlations of the CHSIT to measures of
abstract intelligence.
Thus hopes to establish SI's relative independence
from verbal or abstract intelligence were

frus~rated,

high correlations implied redundancy in measurement.

for
Per-

haps the ebb and flow of interest in SI was connected to the
development of new and always promising tests.

Perhaps too,

investigators of social perception had not made this assumption of relative independence.

In any event, their progress,
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as Walker and Foley (1973) pointed out, was generally smoother
and more consistent.
As noted, investigators of social abilities diverged
into relatively independent streams with little cross-fertilization.

A possible contributer to this divergence could

be the already set state of affairs wherein difference of
method meant more than "choice of device."

Cattell (1966)

noted the various rifts between segments of psychology.

The

earmarks of such rifts ranged from lack of cross-referencing
to mutual challenging of claimed results.

More specifically,

Cattell cited the multivariate versus bivariate experimental
designs as representing distinct traditions in the philosophy of science.
Walker and Foley (1973) however, pointed out a less
speculative cause of this lack of conununication.

Workers

on SI and those on social perception or social action were
focusing on different parts of Thorndike's definition.

As

Walker and Foley stated:
• • • Thorndike specified two types of SI, namely, understanding others and wiae social action • • • it must be
understood that knowing and action must be evaluated
separately before their interaction can be assessed • • •
social understanding itself is a necessary but not
sufficient cause for wise social action. • -;-; This type
of problem and research is not new to psychology and can
be seen as analogous to other comparisons, such as that
between learning and performance (p. 846).
Definitions.

As noted above, Thorndike's definition

of SI included both understanding and action.

This distinc-

tion, in part, reflects the later splitting of research
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directions.

Subsequent definitions of SI added to the com-

plexity of the picture.
In an early review of SI literature, Vernon (1933)
stated:
• • • 'social intelligence' apparently includes ability
to get along with people in general, social technique
• • • susceptability to stimuli from other members of a
group, as well as insight into the temporary moods • • •
of friends and of strangers • • • (p. 44).
Vernon's definition (or overview) widened the boundaries of SI considerably.

The inclusion of susceptability

to group stimuli, which is viewed as a personality factor
by Cattell (1971), raised the question of the relationship
of other factors i.e., personality to SI.
Later definitions appeared to limit the scope of SI.
Thus Chapin (1942) made a distinction, so far unsupported by
data, between SI and "social insight."
Wechsler (1958), on the other hand, offered a brief
and general definition, namely ability to deal with people.
The relationship of this ability to WAIS scores or to a
subtest such as Picture Arrangement has not been stipulated.
The situation of SI then, up to and through 1960,
was one of definitional haziness.

Consequently it was (and

is) difficult to determine its boundaries.

The relationship

between SI and such areas of research as empathy remain unknown in any detail.

Moreover the relative independence of

SI from other types of intelligence was not established.
However O'Sullivan, Guilford and deMille (1965)
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proposed another definition of SI as a cognitive variable,
namely, " • • • ability to understand the thoughts, feelings
and intentions of other people as manifested in discernible,
expressional cues • • • (p. 6)."
The work of O'Sullivan et al. was predicated on a
model initially suggested by Guilford (1956, 1957).

This

model was Guilford's structure of intellect theory which
hypothesized 120 distinct intellectual aptitudes.

In this

structure of intellect model (hereafter referred to as SOI),
30 forms of SI are proposed.
It is important to consider the background of the
SOI model, at least in general outline, so that the reason
for the generation of so many factors can be appreciated.
In The Nature of Human Intelligence, Guildord (1967)
provided a thorough analysis of the thinking and research
that led to the SOI model.

There were three key points in

this analysis.
,
The first point was a negative finding, namely that
little or no research supported a hierarchial structure
within which the known intellectual factors could be arranged.
According to Guilford this type of structure would follow
from concepts such as Spearman's "g" and "s"

type factors.

In Spearman's theory, "g" represented general intelligence
and by definition correlates with any test of intellectual
ability.

"S" was a specific component peculiar to a given

type of intelligence test.

Thus a given test score could be
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analyzed into "g" and "s" factors.

The presence of "g" in

tests, however, not only stipulated a superordinate factor,
but also predicted a degree of correlation between tests of
intelligence that has not been demonstrated.
Guilford's second point also stems from negative
findings, that is, the

sparc~ty

of so-called broad group

factors or those represented by a large number of tests.

On

the other hand, a large number of narrow group factors (close
to 40, Guilford, 1956), have been identified.

This too

militates against a hierarchical structure.
The third and most important point is summarized by
Guilford (1967)
• • • many factors have obviously parallel properties.
For example, if one collects a half-dozen nonverbal
factors in another, it is clear that the factors in the
two sets can be paired off in a meaningful manner. The
psychological operation is the same in each pair; only
the content of the test items is different. Yet the
members of each pair come out of an analysis as separate
factors. • • • Extensive factor analytical results have
proved wrong the belief that the same ability is involved regardless of the kind of information with which
we deal • • • (p. 61).
Thus Guilford reasoned that tests of intelligence may
be alike in some respects i.e., involve the same operation,
but differ in others i.e., content.
sion, product was added.

Moreover a third dimen-

Therefore for a test,

x,

to measure

the same factor as test, Y, tests X and Y would have to have
the same content, utilize the same psychological operation
and have correct responses expressed in the same level of
product.

Conversely, any intelligent act can be described
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in terms of the above dimensions.
The dimensions with their respective subcategories
form a large block comprised of subcubes with each of the
latter representing a cognitive ability.

For purposes of this

paper the SOI model has two chief implications:

(a) the inter-

locking of dimensions fo form subcubes should aid in the construction of tests to measure the ability specified in that
cube1 and (b) tests targeted to the same subcube should correlate more with each other than with tests targeted to other
subcubes.

(It may be argued that tests of behavioral content

should correlate more with each other than, say, with those
in the verbal content area, however, this is not strictly
predicted by the SOI model.)
There are 30 distinct SI abilities proposed by the
SOI model.

Tests of six of these abilities have been devised

(O'Sullivan et al., 19651 O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966).
Three of these six tests were selected as an aid in defining
SI in the present study.
The selected tests are Expression Grouping, Missing
Pictures and Cartoon Predictions.

The first requires that

the examinee relate facial or postural cues into a congruent
whole which expresses one thought, feeling or intention.

The

latter two tests require understanding of the development and
probable conclusion, respectively, of social situations.

The

definition of SI is therefore the ability to recognize the
feelings, or intentions of another person, and, the ability
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to understand basic interpersonal situations.

The examina-

tion of test items also indicates that attention to behavioral
cues is essential to both abilities (O'Sullivan et al., 1965).
The next part of this overview relates to the development of the concept of cognitive style.

The focus will

center on those elements of the schizophrenic's cognitive
style which could affect attention to behavioral cues.
Cognitive Style
In a broad sense cognitive style is related to Freud's
(1909) concept of the ego as moderator between the demands
of the id and those of external reality.

This idea was

amplified by Gardner, Holtzman, Klein, and Spence (1959)
under the name of "cognitive control."
• • • the organism must not only bring needs, impulses and wishes into continual harmony; it must also
resolve the many independent claims of reality. A person
is always in a state of motivation, i.e., never without
purpose. But while much of his behavior is concerned
with reaching satisfying and desirable objects or states,
his attempts at need satisfaction are molded by an even
more central requirement of survival • • • • In our view,
a cognitive control describes an organizational tendency
that relates the functioning of these structures (i.e.,
appraisal of reality) to each other within the person.
It is an intervening structural condition accounting in
part for the particular impact of a need on cognition
(Gardner et al., 1959, pp. 3-4).
In less analytic terms, cognitive style represents
an interaction of intellectual, perceptual, and personality
variables.

This interaction has three components or dimen-

sions which are of main concern to this paper, environmental
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scanning, cognitive filtering or categorization, and social
inhibition.
Scanning and Filtering.

Sullivan (1960) cited the

vigilance of paranoids as a defense against intimacy.

Arieti

(1955) elaborated this theme and speculated that the preparanoid learns to defend against accusations by anticipation,
an activity that contributes to alert scanning of the social
environment.
Broen (1966) and Broen and Storms (1966) noted that
arousal level could influence scanning.

Earlier, Broen

(1964) had speculated that nonparanoids coped with high arousal
by limiting their scanning.
Cromwell (1968) proposed that deviant scanning was
but one facet of the schizophrenic's approach to problem
solving.

Moreover, amount of scanning was insufficient to

differentiate schizophrenic subgroups.

Cromwell

stated that

schizophrenics are characterized by a maladaptive participatory set which included not only extremes in scanning activity,
but also defects in the make-up of cognitive categories, i.e.,
categories were unstable with shifting definitions or were
too rigid.
Silverman (1964; 1967) found evidence that paranoid
schizophrenics scanned more widely than nonparanoid schizophrenics.

Silverman's formulation was based on two prin-

ciples identified by Gardner et al. (1959), namely scanning
control and cognitive

filterin~,

aspects of cognitive control.
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Scanning control reflected the amount or breadth of environmental searching done by an individual.

Cognitive filtering

pertained to the structure of the cognitive categories used
to organize information.

The primary dimension of this

categorical structure was that of narrowness versus wideness.
The implications of either end of the continuum being rigid,
restrictive compartmentalization versus diffuse disorganication respectively,

Silverman found evidence that paranoid

schizophrenics tended to be characterized by extensive
scanning and filtering of data into narrow conceptual categories.

Nonparanoid schizophrenics, on the other hand, showed

a reverse tendency, i.e., little scanning and diffuse categorization.
Silverman further hypothesized that the wide scanning
of the paranoid leads to the reception of many unpleasant
stimulii.

Rather than limit scanning, which would reduce

vigilance, the paranoid copes by forcing data into rigid
nonthreatening categories.
For the paranoid process at least, the relationship
between scanning and f ilering appears to serve a defensive
purpose, cognitive complexity is reduced to preserve vigilance.
In like fashion, the nonparanoid schizophrenic reduces scanning in an effort to control stimulation.

The relationship

between low scanning and diffuse categorization, however, is
not clear.
McGonaghy (1960) postulated that there were two ways
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of deviating from normal associative patterns.

A person

might develop heightened capacity to assign logical meanings to events.

However, a "triumph of logic over conunon

sense" occurs when a person resists data that would conflict
with the original assignment of meaning.

The other type of

deviation is marked by a weakening of the capacity to assign
meaning.

This second pattern leads to vague, fragmented, and

loose associations.

McGonaghy assigned the first pattern to

paranoids and the second to nonparanoid schizophrenics.
Bower, Testin, and Roberts (1960) found some support
for .McGonaghy's hypothesis.

Scales of "disorganization"

and "arbitrary tightening" were applied to the Rorschach
protocols of several diagnostic groups.

Nonparanoid schiso-

phrenics were high on the former scale; paranoid schizophrenics
were higher than all other groups on the latter scale.
The connection between scanning and filtering may not
be limited to the schizophrenic syndrome.

Obsessive com-

pulisve neurosis, for example, may represent a state having
high scanning and a relatively large number of cognitive
categories.

This stance would allow for extensive gathering

of data yet retard decision making and, therefore, the responsibility for acting on choices.
There is a different question concerning the relationship of scanning and filtering in the general or so-called
normal population.

Henry Clay Smith in Sensitivity to People

(1966) has reviewed a number of studies pertinent to this
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question.

Smith concluded that six variables were necessary

to account for the manner and accuracy with which one individual makes judgments about another.

Two of these Smith

labels as "judging habits of the perceiver."

These habits

are defined in terms of rating scale dimensions or response
styles.

Smith's analysis, plus those of Guilford (1954)

and Cronbach (1955), suggest that there are several variables which determine a response or cognitive style.

Of these,

there is close correspondence between what Smith calls perceiver "level" and "spread" and Guilford's (1954) analysis
of the effect of constant errors of judges on rating scale
scores.
Smith also proposed that a reciprocal, and not always
helpful relationship existed between the individual's skills
of observation and his stereotypes, i.e., knowledge or
prejudices about various groups, and what attributes would be
expected to correlate with group memberships.

In Smith's

analysis "stereotype" knowledge represents a continuum from
over-simplified gross prejudices to multiple analysis of a
person in terms of his or her affiliations with several groups.
In a similar sense, Gollin (1958) and Gollin and Rosenberg (1956)
proposed a concept of "relational thinking."

Their studies

investigated the ability of subjects to link together seemingly
disparate classes of social affiliation, e.g., state what the
following have in common:

Catholic, Buddhist, Conununist.

Gollin found that subjects differed not only in cognitive
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complexity, i.e., ability to see similarities and differences
in affiliations, but also that this complexity or relational
thinking ability correlated significantly with accuracy
measures of judgments about others.

Gollin also suggested

that there was a negative correlation of relational thinking
to speed of figure closure.

Smith (1966) added that closure

speed was a possible analog to the speed used to "shut off"
data about others so that a decision might be made.

This

suggests that rapid closure interferes with scanning.
The evidence suggests an inverse relationship between
filtering and scanning for the schizophrenias only.

The

dovetailing of these components for other groups cannot be
stated as simply.

Figure closure speed may reflect scanning

interference for schizophrenics, but not, for
workmen engaged in quality control tasks.

for

exa~ple,

Closure speed,

however, is related to another dimension of cognitive style
and is discussed below.
Inhibition.

Pemberton (1952) and Pawlik (1966) stated

that closure speed is a component test of the personality

factor called "inhibition" or "h" by Cattell (1965).

Cattell

saw one example of this inhibition to be a cautious and timid
approach to events.

"H" is a bi-polar factor related to

inhibition and appears in Cattell's Sixteen
Questionnaire (1957).

Personali~y

Factor

Examination of the items comprising

factor H indicates that H has special reference to the approach
to social or interpersonal events.

Roughly, H appears to re-
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late to the comfort experienced while engaging others, or
being the center of attention.

H, a specialized form of

inhibition, is viewed in the present research as a potential
influence an SI and shaper of cognitive style.

High in-

hibition, for example, could limit the amount of social
interactions and result in decreased practice.
SI and Schizophrenic Cognitive Style
A general conceptualization of the relationship between social intelligence and cognitive style can be made
by analogy to the relationship between learning and performance.

More specifically, Thorndike's definition of SI was a

formulation of SI both as "learned" in the sense of a cognitive ability, and "performance" in the sense of "acting
wisely."

Wise social action, however, might be expected to

be associated with two aspects of cognitive style, namely
scanning and cognitive filtering.

These two terms approx-

imate the individual's appraisal of the social situation,
an appraisal which is also influenced by the individual's
prior experiences with social situations.

A resultant

function of the person's past dealings with people can be
formulated as his readiness to deal with others as opposed
to inhibition.
The cognitive style with which a person approaches a
situation is describable in terms of his filtering of data,
scanning of data, and inhibition.

His performance or ef-
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fectiveness in the given situation, however, is not only a
function of his cognitive style and abilities, but also a
function of two additional factors, namely, process and
situation specific.

Process means that the individual's

style and ability for a given social event are actualized or
retarded by the skills, or lack thereof, of the other participants.

Situation specific factors refer to the demands,

structure, and purpose of the given social situation.
Table 4 provides a summary statement of how three
diagnostic groups might be expected to differ from one another
and from an "idealized normal" group in terms of the dimensions.
Social Intelligence, however, is not shown as a
dimension but is viewed as a set of cognitive abilities.
Extreme positions on any or all of the dimensions shown in
Table 4 are hypothesized to impair SI, e.g., a severe constriction of scanning would result in reduced attention to
behavioral cues.
A different rationale accounts for the exclusion of
inhibition as a dimension in Table 4.

As indicated earlier,

closure speed is a component of the inhibition factor and
bears a possible relationship to the amount of environmental
scanning done by the individual.

Only extreme scores on both

closure speed and inhibition, however, appear to have implications as sources of interference.

It may be a sound analogy

to relate speedy closure to overly quick decision making, but
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Table 4
Relative Projected Positions of 4 Groups on
2 Dimensions of Cognitive Style
Dimension
Group

Number of
Categories

Amount of
Scanning

Idealized
Normal

High

High

Nonparanoid
Schiz.

High

Low

Paranoid
Schiz.

Low

High

Obsessive
Compulsive

High

High
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the resemblance is confounded when tests of figure closure
are examined (see Appendix B).

Such tests combine, in terms

of correct response, factors of speed and accuracy.

Thus

high scores reflect competence in both areas while low scores
indicate weakness in speed, accuracy, or both.
The picture for inhibition scores is also difficult.
Extremely high inhibition would seem to def late SI through
either decreasing scanning, as an analog of interpersonal
anxiety, or as a reducer of social practice.

The other ex-

treme, that of relative lack of inhibition, may adversely
effect SI, but the "how" of this relationship is difficult
to conceptualize.

It may indicate a propensity to take the

center of attention too often and therefore, "unwisely,"
but this appears to place too great a burden on the likaness
of one personality variable to overt behavior.
The questions of how an SI score is affected by cognitive style variables and that of what factor the given SI
scores measures, are interdependent.

That is, not all of the

SI abilities appear to be equally dependent on scanning or any
other single dimension.

Thus it remains to reexamine that part

of the Structure of Intellect model which Guilford (1967)
calls "Behavioral."
O'Sullivan et al. (1965), described the nature and
development of several tests of SI.

Later, O'Sullivan and

Guilford (1966) published the Six Factor Tests of Social
Intelligence.

Both sources indicated that research has, so
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far, focused on the operation called Cognitive in relation to
behavioral content.
Four of the areas are:

(a) Cognition of Behavioral

Classes which requires the assembly of units (facial expressions and postures for example) into congruent expressions of
one thought, feeling or attitude; (b) Cognition of Behavioral
Systems which requires the interpolation of a missing segment
into a pictured social interaction; (c) Cognition of Behavioral
Implications.

Here the testee must determine which alter-

native represents the best completion of a serially depicted
social event; and, (d) Cognition of Behavioral Transformations
wherein the testee must select the alternative that most
radically changes a depicted social process.
Some theoretical statements can now be made about
the connections of these four factors to previously postulated dimensions of cognitive style.

The Expression Grouping

subtest requires the subject to integrate cues from different
sources into a one unified social message.

Low scanning

reduces the probability of attending to these various cues and
could result in Expression Grouping scores indicating impairment in low scanners.
Less obvious are the effects of the remaining dimensions of cognitive style, number of categories and inhibition.

One effect of an extremely low number of cate-

gories would be to reduce scores on tests of cognition of
behavioral transformations, e.g., Picture Exchange, via lack
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of ability to build complex sets.
lematic.

This, however, is prob-

It does appear that the model of cognitive style is

too simplistic to predict any main effect for the factor of
transformations.
To venture beyond the so-called obvious predictions,
it may be more useful to consider sets of dimensions as applied
to groups and predict selective SI deficits.
In Table 5, are listed three gross diagnostic subgroups and their respective tendencies expressed as high or
low, on three dimensions of cognitive style.
Note that while the schizophrenic categories contain
other subgroups, the nonschizophrenic grouping is defined
by a process of exclusion.

Since it is composed of patients

with various types of pathology, it is too heterogeneous to
be simply characterized on these dimensions.
The schizophrenic subgroups are differentiated most
clearly (Table 5) by the dimensions of category number and
amount of scanning.

Scott (1962) proposed a Differentiation

Index which would yield the number of categories used by
individuals.

Scanning, on the other hand, has been related to

the factors of speed of figure closure and inhibition (Cattell,
1965).

Measures of these respective factors are the Closure

Speed Test (Thurstone & Jeffrey, 1960) and factor "H" extracted from Cattell's 16 PF Test (Cattell & Eber, 1957).
Extremely high scores on these tests are expected to indicate
low scanning extremely low scores, relatively slow figure
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Table 5
Difference Between Subgroups by Dimension
of Cognitive Style
Dimension
Number of
Categories

Inhibition

Paranoid
Schizophrenic

Low

Low

High

Nonparanoid
Schizophrenic

High

High

Low

Nonschizophrenic

Variable for all dimensions

Subgroup

Scanning
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closure and low inhibition, are related to high scanning
activity.
This analysis leads to the prediction of differences
in social intelligence and cognitive style between schizophrenic subgroups.

Selective SI deficits are posited to be

characteristic of the schizophrenias.

While defining the

exact place of such deficits in etiology is beyond the scope
of this paper, these impairments are proposed to be distinct
from other measures of ability and from the effects of hospital confinement.

Any evidence for a selective impairment

would be negated if schizophrenics were found to score significantly lower than nonschizophrenics on a variety of
measures, i.e., verbal intelligence as well as SI.
Hypotheses
1.

Subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic have sig-

nificantly lower scores on the SI tests Missing Pictures and
Cartoon Predictions than subjects with diagnoses other than
schizophrenia.
2.

Subjects diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic will

have higher scores on the SI test, Expression Grouping, than
subjects in other diagnostic categories.
3.

Subjects diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic will

show a lower mean nwnber of cognitive categories as measured
by Scott's Differentiation Index than subjects with diagnoses
other than paranoid schizophrenia.
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4.

Nonparanoid schizophrenics will have a higher

mean number of cognitive categories, as measured by Scott's
Index, than patients with diagnoses other than schizophrenia.
5.

There will be a significant negative correlation

between closure speed, as measured by the Closure Speed
Test (Thurstone & Jeffrey, 1960) and Expression Grouping
scores.
6.

Scores reflecting low inhibition (Cattell's factor

"H, 11 ) will correlate positively with Expression Grouping.

ME THO~

Subjects
Subjects were drawn from those admitted to Chicago
Read Mental He«lth Center for in-patient psychiatric care.
Patients resided in wards D-North and o-south.
Ninety percent of these patients were from the
Chicago areas called Lincoln Park, Loop and Lower North.
All patients were from lower to lower middle socio-economic
level i.e., many were on Public Aid or had a gross income
of less than $6,000.00 per year.

The mean years of formal

education was just under 10 with a range of five to 14.
Testing was attempted on 56 subjects.
could not be given the entire test battery.

Of these, 29
Fourteen re-

fused to cooperate to the conclusion of the test series.
Testing was halted on another seven subjects when evidence
was found to make their inclusion doubtful, e.g., organic
states, perceptual handicaps.

Another eight subjects left

the hospital by transfer, discharge, or unauthorized absence
before completion of testing.
Of the 27 subjects teste(j, 14 were female and 13 were
male.

The breakdown by category was:

nonschizophrenic,

nine; nonparanoid schizophrenic, ten; and, paranoid schizophrenic, eight.

Appendix D shows subgroups composition by

sex, age, and educational level.
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Two considerations influenced the selection of
subjects.

First 6 symptoms such as hallucinations had to

be mild so as to not interfere with testing or distort its
results.

Second, there had to be reasonable agreement as

to the subject's diagnosis, i.e., subjects were assigned to
one of three groups, paranoid schizophrenic, nonparanoid
schizophrenic, or nonschizophrenic on the following bases:
a.

If a subject were a readmission, previous diag-

noses were considered for agreement.
b.

If previous diagnoses were variable, the opinion

of two senior clinicians was sought.

If there continued to

be no agreement, the subject was not tested.
c.

If a subject were a first admission, the procedure

outlined in "b" above was followed.
Three subtests were taken from the Six Faster Tests
of Social Intelligence (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966).

Ex-

pression Grouping requires the testee to integrate diverse
behavioral cues such as posture or facial expression into a
congruent whole.

Missing Pictures presents the subject with

a series of photographs of an ongoing social situation in
which one picture is left out.

The subject's task to to

select the alternative picture that best completes the depicted
situation.

Cartoon Prediction presents a series of social

situations in which the last or concluding cartoon is omitted.
The subject's task is to select the alternative cartoon that
represents the best or most usual conclusion to the situation.
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All of these instruments are scored by the formula, number
correct minus a fraction of the numLer wrong.

The fraction

represents the number of alternate responses.

Omitted items

were not deducted from the score.
An important consideration is whether or not a def-

icit in SI, found in any of the above tests, reflects an SI
deficit, or merely that a given subgroup is deficient in a
number of areas.

Accordingly, the Verbal scale of the

Shipley-Hartford (1946) series was included to determine if
groups were equivalent in areas other than SI.

This test is

in multiple choice format and requires the testee to select
a synonym for each stimulus word.

Scoring is done by counting

the number of correct choices.
The H scale or inhibition was extracted from the
Sixteen Personality Factor Test (Cattell & Eber, 1957).

The

format is multiple choice and all items are shown in Appendix
A.

Scores for this test are reported in raw form

weighted form (Hw).

(Hr)

and

The latter represents conversions from

a table by Cattell and Eber which is based on the general
population sample.

No standard score tables currently exist

for psychiatric samples and the general population conversion
made identification of extreme scores easier.
Scott's Differentiation Index (1962) completed the
battery.

It was used to give an approximation of the number

of categories used by a subject in differentiating a small
sample of other persons.

Time considerations forced the
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simplication of the test.

Preliminary steps used to define

significant others and roles were eliminated.

The revised

format is shown in Appendix B.
Instructions were taken from Mehrabian (1968).

The

measure of the number of categories is the Differentiation
Score or "H, 11 which was yielded by the formula:
H - 1092 N-1/ N, I(Ni log2 ni)
where log is to base 2, N = number of different names or
persons used and ni is an index of those appearing in more
than one group.
Procedure
No strict order of presentation of the seven subtests was used.

The Shipley verbal scale was, however,

usually administered first as its format and content was
considered to be more familiar to subjects, than that of SI
tests.
Factors such as time available to the patient that
day, his or her cooperativeness and fatigue, were often
decisive in determining which test or tests would follow
the verbal scale.

For all tests, save Scott's Differentiation

Index, instructions were read to the subject.

Once timed tests

were begun, those in the SI series, no questions were answered.
All remarks addressed to patients were those of encouragement.
Before formal testing was initiated, and after the
subject gave some indication that he would cooperate, the
testee was told that the battery was experimental.

Inter-
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pretation of the results would be given to his or her treatment coordinator only if such results could help or provide
useful information.

The subject was also told that while

the testing might not provide any definite help to him, the
results, in total, might be of some help to other patients.
Most testees required additional encouragement and
explanation with the Scott Index.

Despite these efforts,

nine of the twenty-seven subjects who completed the other
tests could not or would not complete the Scott Index.
In no case did a testee respond unfavorably to
positive reinforcement, "You're doing fine" or encouragement,
"Just keep trying, 11 although such devices did not prevent
some subjects from refusing to continue.

While the data

base is small, three cases, it does not appear advisable
to proceed with other SI tests, if a subject is unable to
cope with the SI instrument that is presented first.

RESULTS

Table 6 presents the means, medians and standard
deviations by subgroup and total sample for the following
tests:

the Verbal scale from the Shipley, Figure Closure

Speed, Inhibition raw and weighted scores, Missing Pictures,
Cartoon Predictions and Expression Grouping.
Inspection of Table 6 reveals that the paranoid subgroup scored approximately the same as nonschizophrenics on
all measures.

Both groups showed higher mean scores than

the nonparanoid schizophrenics.
Table 7 presents the results of a one-way analyses
of variance (Winer, 1962) for the three groups.

This

analyses yielded significant differences between groups
for three measures, Inhibition (standard scores), Missing
Pictures, and Expression Grouping.
results of

~

Table 8 presents the

tests between all combinations of subgroups

for the three tests.

This table, in conjunction with the

presentation of means in Table 5 shows that paranoid schizophrenics and nonparanoids did not significantly differ in
any measure, but that each of these groups scored significantly higher than the nonparanoid schizophrenics on all
three measures.

Thus Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported.

Subjects diagnosed as nonparanoid schizophrenic scored
lower than other subjects on Missing Pictures.

Cartoon

,
Table 6
Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation Scores by Test, Subgroup, and Total Sample
Group
Nonparanoid
Schizophrenic
N=Q

NonSchizophrenic
N=lO

Paranoid
Schizophrenic

Total
N=27

N=B

Test

Mean

Md

s . .i.).

Mean

Md

S.D.

Mean

Md

S.D.

Mean

Md

S.D.

Verbal

23.0

21.5

8.4

28.2

30.0

8.1

26.6

27.5

7.8

25.8

24.0

8.3

Figure
Closure

11.6

11.0

3.0

15.6

15.0

6.1

14.3

14.0

4.2

13.7

14.3

4.9

Inhibition
Raw Score

8.4

8.6

3.2

11.8

12.0

5.0

14.8

14.0

3.5

11.4

13.0

4.8

Inhibition
Weighted

3.8

4.0

1.2

s.o

5.0

1.8

6.0

6.0

1.3

4.9

5.4

2.6

Missing
Pictures

7.1

6.7

1.8

10.3

10.0

2.3

9.5

9.7

2.0

8.9

8.7

2.6

Expression
Grouping

10.8

11.5

3.5

17.0

17.7

4.6

18.3

19.1

3.7

15.4

16.5

5.2

Cartoon
Predictions

14.6

15.7

4.0

17.5

18.3

2.9

17.4

18.3

2.9

16.9

17.4

3.8

~

()'\
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Table 7
F Ratio Value from One-Way .Analyses of Variance by Test for
the Schizophrenic, Non-schizophrenic and Paranoid Groups
Test

F

Verbal

1.1

NS

Figure Closure

1.5

NS

Inhibition-raw Score

2.9

NS

Inhibition-standard score

4.7

.OS

Missing Pictures

6.5

.01

Cartoon Predictions

1.5

NS

Expression Grouping

7.0

.01
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Table 8
Results of t Tests for Three Measures
by Subgroup Pairings

Groups

Test

Paranoid
Nonparanoid
Schizophrenic

t

t

Inhibition
Standard
Score
Missing
Pictures
Expression
Grouping

Paranoid
and NonSchizophrenic

Non-Schizophrenic &
Nonparanoid
t

10.5

.01

1.1

NS

2.5

.05

6.6

.01

1.9

NS

8.8

.01

11.2

.01

1.7

NS

8.6

.01
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Predictions did not differentiate the subgroups as expected,
and the relative superiority of paranoid schizophrenics on
Missing Pictures was not predicted.

Hypothesis 2 did not

predict the obtained lack of difference between paranoids and
nonschizophrenics on Expression Grouping.
Table 6 does not show group scores for Scott's Index.
Of the 27 subjects only 16 yielded scorable protocols for
this measure.

A modification of the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis

of Variance (Siegel, 1956) was applied to this smaller N,
with a finding of no significance of difference between subgroups.

Therefore Hypothesis 3 which predicted significantly

lower scores for paranoids was not supported.

Similarly,

Hypothesis 4, which predicted a higher mean number of cognitive
categories for nonparanoid schizophrenics, was not supported.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 concerned correlations.

Table

9 presents Spearman Rank Order Correlations between all
measures by subgroup and total sample.

Hypothesis 5 predicted

a significant negative correlation between Closure Speed and
Expression Grouping.

Although small negative correlations

were found for the paranoid (-.24) and nonparanoid schizophrenic (-.08) subgroups for these measures, the correlations
were not significant and the hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 6 predicted a significant positive correlation between Inhibition and low scoring on Expression
Grouping.

Rho ranged from -.25 to +.28 and did not reach

significance.

Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

,
Table 9
Rank Order Correlations between Tests by Subgroup and Total Sample
Test
Figure

Test and Group
Verbal:
Total
Nonschizophrenic
Schizophrenic
Paranoid
Figure Closure:
Total
Nonschizophrenic
Schizophrenic
Paranoid
Inhibition Raw Score:
Total
Nonschizophrenic
Schizophrenic
Paranoid
Missing Pictures:
Total
Nonschizophrenic
Schizophrenic
Paranoid
Cartoon Predictions:
Total
Nonschizophrenic
Schizophrenic
Paranoid
* 12

~

• 05

Closure
.48**
.42
.46
.32

Raw Score
Inhibition

Missing
Pictures

Cartoon
Predictions

Expression
Grouping

.24
-.27
.49
.31

.25
.61*
-.22
.25

.47**
.37
.89**
-.06

.51**
.70*
.39
-.40

.17
.35
-.42
-.02

.21
.07
.43
-.32

.24
.20
-.08
-.24

• 02
-.33
-.12
.13

.24
-.30
.37
•• 33

.14
-.25
.04
.28

.44
.35
-.29
.91**

.59**
.63*
-.14
.57

.31
.35
• 52
.. 05

.73**
.72*
.73*
.67*
**

E.

~

.01 (two tail test)

(JI

0

DISCUSS IO~

Three concepts had a primary role in generating the
hypotheses of this dissertation.

These were:

(a) the schizo-

phrenic syndrome is characterized by selective deficits in
social intelligence abilities1 (b) the deficits are selective
in that different forms of the syndrome are marked by different performance decrements of SI abilities i.e., paranoid
schizophrenics would do well in tests involving scanning,
but not well where cognitive flexibility was demanded; and
(c) a given deficit can be understood in terms of the cognitive style associated with the syndrome.

Thus special

attention given to the paranoid's wide scanning, one facet
of his cognitive style.
Two SI tests differentiated between the paranoid and
nonparanoid forms of schizophrenia.

It was hypothesized,

however, that only one of these measures, Expression Grouping, would so delineate the groups.

Moreover, the deficits

predicted for paranoids in SI were not found and an inspection of the mean scores for all tests suggests that the
paranoids' functioning was closer to that of nonschizophrenics
than to that of the other schizophrenics.

This similarity

does not appear to mean that the paranoids and nonschizophrenics
simply functioned better or more adequately than nonparanoid
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sc11izophrenics.

Had this been the case, all or nearly all

of the measures employed would have yielded significant differences to the detriment of the nonparanoid schizophrenics.
A different conclusion is more consistent with the
results.

Namely, the groups used were defined in two instances

by the principle of exclusion, i.e.,

~schizophrenic

and

nonparanoid schizophrenic, and were thereby more heterogeneous
than the paranoid sample.

This leads to the spec,lation

taat more clear cut deficits might be demonstrated if additional distinctions had been used, e.g., the continuwn of
acute-chronic as suggested by Spohn, Thetford, and Cancro
(1970).

Adding a new dimension would yield more homogeneous

groups.
While the use of less heterogeneous samples might be
useful, it also appears that the measures of SI and cognitive
style may have presented certain problems.

First of all,

additional evidence is needed to demonstrate the relative
independence of the SI measures developed by O'Sullivan and
Guilford (1966}.

Stated simply, such SI measures should cor-

relate more strongly with each other than with tests involving
other traits or abilities.

O'Sullivan and Guilford reported

relatively low but significant correlations (i.e., .20 to
.30) between SI and verbal intelligence measures.

The

tendency of results in the present paper favored the relative
independence of SI tests.

One measure however, Cartoon Pre-

dictions, was found to have a positive significant relationship
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{.89) with the verbal scale.

~his

last finding may be an

artifact, and so may be the lack of differentiation between
groups shown by Cartoon Predictions.

However, all of the

measures in the Six Factor Tests of Social Intelligence are
still in the experimental stage and require further validation before artifact can be sharply distinguished from differential functioning.

For instance, studies utilizing the

muntitrait-multimethod approach (Campbell & Fiske, 1959)
would be advantageous in investigating the convergent and
discriminant validity of SI measures.
A second problem concerning the tests used in this
paper was Scott's Differentiation Index (1962).

This was to

be a direct measure of the number of cognitive categories
used in appraising other people.

Even in its simplified form,

Scott's Index appeared to be unsuitable for psychiatric inpatients.

If possible this index should be simplified and

restructured to allow time for the subject to practice with
the format.
In view of the above, it is not at all clear that
selective deficits in SI differentiate between psychiatric
groups.

Not only are the results inconsistent with this

proposal, i.e., no significant differences found between
paranoids and nonschizophrenics, but also the issue is clouded
by questions concerning the sample and tests used.

It remains

to consider the model underlying the hypotheses.
The structure of cognitive style as presented in this
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paper was overly simplified.

Three dimensions of this style

had been identified as scanning, the number of cognitive
categories used, and degree of social inhibition.

Even

if given the assumption that the number of dimensions is
adequate, it now appears that the dimensions require further
elaboration or that they be replaced.

Moreover, it is doubt-

ful that one of the dimensions, scanning, was measured at all.
Both points can be illustrated by considering the logical
association made between scanning and figure closure.

Rapid

figure closure was proposed to interfere with scanning.
Thus high scores in closure were predicted to correlate
negatively with scores of Expression Grouping, a test assumed
to require relatively wide scanning.

Correlations ranged

from -.24 to .24 and did not attain significance.

Of most

importance is the fact that the relationships of closure and
Expression Grouping to scanning are merely inferential.
There is no impelling reason to conclude that scanning was
measured, even indirectly.
One way of elaborating the dimension of scanning would
be to more carefully study the relationship between it and
closure.

Speed of closure, in itself, is an insufficient

index to scanning activity.

Of equal or more pertinence is

the efficiency of closure as identified by Holtzman (1970),
i.e., the ability to select and store relevant data while in
the approach phase of problem solving.

In the final analysis,

scanning should be replaced by speed and efficiency of closure
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as a dimension of cognitive style.

This step would provide

direct measurement in place of inference.

SUJ:.llh\~Y

Selective differences in social intelligence (SI)
abilities were hypothesized to differentiate among three
psychiatric groups, paranoids, nonparanoid schizophrenics,
and

nonschizophrenics.

The theoretical explanation for dif-

ferential SI functioning was the concept of cognitive style,
defined as a typical approach to problem solving in the face
of competing demands.

Dimensions of cognitive style were

identified as amount of scanning, number of cognitive categories, and degree of inhibition.
Extreme positions on these dimensions were posited
to reflect cognitive approachos .. which could interfere with SI
abilities.

Paranoids were predicted to evidence more scanning,

but less inhibition and to use fewer cognitive categories than
other schizophrenics.

It was also predicted that paranoids

would use fewer categories than nonschizophrenics.

Non-

paranoid schizophrenics were predicted to show less scanning
and more inhibition and to use more categories than nonschizophrenics.
A test battery was devised to assess social intelligence and cognitive style.

Three SI measures, Cartoon

Predictions, Missing Pictures, and Expression Grouping, were
taken from the Six Factor Tests of Social Intelligence.

An

inhibition scale (H) was extracted from Cattell's Sixteen
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Personality Factor Questionnaire.

Scott's Differentiation

Index was used to indicate number of cognitive categories.
Scanning was indirectly measured by speed of figure closure
and Expression Grouping.

A verbal intelligence scale was

included for purposes of control and correlational study.
Subjects were selected from receiving units of Chicago
Read Mental Health Center.
all or most of the battery.
the Differentiation Index.

Of the 56 involved, 27 completed
Most subjects could not understand
That measure was not included in

the analysis and predictions about number of categories were
not tested.
No significant differences were found between patients
diagnosed as

paranoids and nonschizophrenics.

Both groups

scored significantly higher than nonparanoid schizophrenics
on the SI measures, Expression Grouping and Cartoon Predictions.

Paranoids had significantly lower inhibition scores

than nonparanoid schizophrenics.

Expected correlations be-

tween Expression Grouping figure closure and inhibition were
not found.

However, the groups were roughly equivalent in

verbal intelligence.
Consequently, predicted selective deficits in SI were
not demonstrated.

Reexamination of the proposed model of

cognitive style indicated that it was overly simplistic and
that the connection proposed between scanning and the SI test,
Expression Grouping, was probably erroneous.

The differences

found between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics suggest
further research in the relationship of SI to Differential
diagnosis.
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Items from the H Factor of Cattell's 16 PF Test
1.

On social occasions I: (a) readily come forward; (b)
respond in between; (c) pref er to stay quietly in the
background.

2.

I get slightly embarrassed if I suddenly become the focus
of attention in a social groups (a) yes (b) in between
(c) no.

3.

I am always glad to join a large gathering, for example,
a party, dance, or public meeting (a) yes (b) in between
(c) no.

4.

I ten~ to deep quiet in the presence of senior persons
(people of greater experience, age or rank) (a) yes
(b) in between (c) no.

5.

I find it hard to address a large group (a) yes (b) in
between (c) no.

6.

My reserve always stands in the way when I want to speak
to an attractive stranger of the opposite sex (a) yes
(b) in between (c) no.

7.

I would rather have a job with (a) a fixed certain salary
(b) in between (c) a larger salary but depending on my
persuading people I am worth it.

8.

Quite small setbacks occasionally irritate me too much
(a) yes (b) il between (c) no.

9.

I have as many friends of the opposite sex as of my own
(a) yes (b) in between (c) no.

10.

Even in an important game I am more concerned to enjoy
it than to win (a) always (b) generally (c) occasionally.

11.

I consider myself a very sociable outgoing person (a)
yes (b) in between (c) no.

12.

In social contacts I (a) show my emotions as I wish (b}
in between {c) keep my emotions to myself.

13.

I somewhat dislike having a group watch me work (a) yes
(b) in between (c) no.

14.

I'm the energetic type who keeps busy (a) yes (b) in
between (c) no.
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Instructions to Subjects for
Scott's Differentiation Index
A.

Here is a list of words. Think of the person who best
fits the meaning of each word. Put his or her name,
nickname, or initials on the line after each word.
Father
Spouse

Mother

~~~~

Boss

~~~~

Teacher

~~~~

Brother or Sister

~~~~

Relative

~~~~

Friend

~~~~

~~~~

Enemy

~~~~

~~~~

Therapist

~~~~

D.

Arrange into groups the names you have listed in Part A
above. Make as many groups as you can and feel free to
place the same person in your different groups. Assign
a letter to each of your groups in order to identify it.
Once you have written out the lists of persons in each of
your groups, we would like you to do the following. What
made you place the different people in each of the groups?
Please state your reason briefly.

APPENDIX C

Please

CLOSURE SPEED
(Gestalt Completion)

fi II

.1n:

Nome
Age

Sex

Dote

Oc c upoti on

!oared by: L.L. Thurstone, Ph.D. and T.E. Jeffrey, Ph.D.
The Psychometric Laboratory

The University of North Carolina

Directions
Below is an incomplete picture of a man pushing a wheelbarrow. A description
of what the picture represents has been written on the black line under it.

Below are some more pictures for you to identify., Write your answers on the lines.

'

)

WHEN YOU GET THE SIGNAL TO BEGIN, open your booklet and identify
more pictures of the same kind. Work as fast as you can until you are told
to stop. If some pictures are too difficult, skip them, and return to them
later if you have time. You may need more than one word to identify the
picture fully. You will have three minutes to do as much as you can.
STOP HERE.

WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
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Identify the pictures. Return later to those you find difficult.
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APPENDIX D

r

Data by Subgroup-Age, Sex, Years of Education and Test Score
Initial

Sex
a.

JS
PF
PD
SS
ML"i

JH
JL
RM

ES

F

F
M
M
M

M
M

b.
F

SS
SP
BW

F

MJ

F
F
F

SB

F

RB

M
M
M
M

PI
NL
RH

c.
EH
JG

F

F

NW
EM

F
F

IG
GZ
AG
RZ

M
M
M
M

Educ.

v

FC

Hr

Hw

MP

CP

EG

Subgroup Nonschizophrenic
30
33
37
30

F

F

MB

Age

35

63
34
29
37

7
13
11
6
5
8
9
12
9

20
28
36
31
30
35
19
40
15

10
19
14
11
27
16
6
22
15

8

19
4
6
18
15
9
12
15

4
8
2
3
7
6
4
5
6

10.67
8.33
14.00
10.00
11.00
7.67
7.33
14.00
9.33

16.00
11.00
22.33
12.00
15.00
19.33
17.33
24.00
18.67

7.50
8.25
21.00
11.00
19.00
16.00
18.75
24.00
17.75

5.67
8.33
7.00
6.00
8.67
8.67
6.00
4.67

16.50
7.50
14.50
14.00
12.00
5.50
6.00
9.00
11.50
11.75

20.25
9.25
17.75
18.25
20.50
18.00
20.00
22.25

Nonparanoid Schizophrenic
25
45
42
31
29
30
35
49
36
43

8
5

7
12
9
11
8

7
6
13

40
16
24
11
23
20
17
21
36
22

14
14
11
8
8
11

10
8
10
4
6

9

10

13
18
10

14

5

s.oo

9

4

10.67

19.67
13.00
18.00
11.00
17.33
6.67
10.33
15.00
18.67
16.33

5

8.33
7.00
9.33
6.33
13.00
11.00
12.00
10.00

16.00
12.00
19.00
14.00
21.33
17.67
20.00
19.00

8
3

5
4
5
2
3
4
5
1

Paranoid Schizophrenic
47
30
36
35
31
37
23
29

5
7

9
11
13
12
7
13

25
39
19
17
32
33
23
30

14
16
13
14
5
21
17
14

11
11
14
22
18
14
13
16

5

6
9
7
5
5

6

f

APPENDIX E

Comparison to Mean and Standard Deviation of Psychiatric
Sample to Sample of O'Sullivan and Guilford (1966)
Test
Expression
Grouping

Missing
Pictures

Cartoon
Predictions

Psychiatric
Sample

Mean

s.o.

15.4
5.2

8.9
2.6

16.9
3.8

From O'Sullivan
and Guilford

Mean

19.1

13.2
2.6

20.9
3.0

s.o.

3.7
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